Occupational communitie s repre se nt bounded cultures populated by people with similar work identities that transcend organizational settings. In this paper, I e xamine the re lationship betwe en an occupational community's culture and its ability to control strategic re sources that advantage its members. Drawing on an e mpirical examination of the Canadian forensic accounting, I argue that reputation acts as a strate gic resource, not only for individual me mbers, but for the community as a whole. The community's practice standards and me mbe rship rules work to he ighte n the importance of individual practitioners' reputations, which in turn be ne fits client commun ities by conferring legitimacy on their claims, and re stricts entry into forensic accounting. The role of reputation in Canadian forensic accounting serves to illuminate the importance of resources that, rathe r than being he ld in some proprietary fashion, are share d among actors who are, ostensibly, in compe tition with one anothe r.
INTRODUCTION
While most organizational researche rs would prefer to de scribe themselve s as "professors," "acade mics," or "researchers," rathe r than as "employe e s," organizational re se arch continue s to ove rlook the importance of occupations and occupational communitie s in the structuring of organizations and inte r-organiz ational re lations hips. O ve r a de cade ago, Van Maane n and Barley (1984) de velope d the concept of occupational community and de scribed its implications for re se arch into care ers, organizational comple xity, loyalty, and innovation. Since the n, howeve r, re lative ly little at-te ntion has be en paid to occupational communitie s in the organizational lite rature despite the dramatic change s in the nature of work and occupations (Barley, 1996) . This pape r is motivate d by the nee d to dire ctly addre ss the implications of the structuring of work in occupational communitie s for core issues in organizational rese arch. Spe cifically, this pape r e xamine s the relationship betwe en the structuring of an occupational community and the social construction and control of a strate gic re source . Drawing on an e mpirical e xamination of the role of reputation as a strate gic re source in the Canadian forensic accounting community, I argue that re putation plays a strategic role, not only for the membe rs of the community to whom re putation is ascribe d, but for the occupational community as a whole . The Canadian forensic accounting community has de ve lope d standards of practice and membership rules that work to he ighte n the importance of individual practitione rs' re putations. In turn, this works to be nefit the client communitie s that fore nsic accounting se rves and, at the same time , restrict access to the community to those already e stablishe d practitione rs.
This pape r is pre sente d in thre e major se ctions. In the first section, I revie w the concept of occupational community. The second section presents an empirical study of the Canadian forensic accounting community and the role of reputation the re in. Finally, I discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this study for our unde rstanding of the re lationship be tween strate gic resources and occupational communitie s.
OCCUPATIONAL COMMUNITIES
" [O ] ccupational communitie s re pre sent bounde d work culture s populate d by people who share similar identitie s and value s that transce nd specific organizational se ttings" (Van Maane n & Barle y, 1984, p. 314) . The work culture s of occupational communitie s produce and re produce themselve s through a varie ty of rituals, accounts, logics, and language which reinforce the value and distinctive ness of the occupation. The most central cultural element in an occupational community is a subje ct position that is define d in te rms of the work and provide s members of the community with the ir core occupational ide ntity: the homicide detective, the organizational behavior profe ssor, the heavy-duty mechanic. Subje cts are produce d in interaction and continuously re-create d through discourse , "as people le arn to vie w the mselves from the point of vie w of othe rs" (Van Maane n & Barle y, 1984, p. 298) . The discourse associate d with an occupational community also define s a se t of subje ct positions, such as clie nts, compe titors, aspirants, and appre ntices, that toge the r make se nsible the contribution and status of the core occupational ide ntity. The interactions of community members with the mselve s and with inte rde pe nde nt "outside rs" work to produce expe ctations re garding appropriate behavior, re lationships, and range of le gitim ate action. This might occur through the socialization of ne w members by more e xpe rienced community members, or through the e stablishme nt of sanctions and rewards by exte rnal actors. The relationship of clients to the core occupational identity is e vide nced, for example , in the global profe ssional accounting industry, in which firms have moved to structure the ir organizations in a manne r that is isomorphic with those of the ir key clie nts, mimicking the de gre e of global centralization or de centralization (Gree nwood, Coope r, Hinings, & Brown, 1993 ; Gree nwood, Rose , Coope r, Hinings, & Brown, forthcoming) .
As a "bounde d work culture ," an occupational community is associate d with sets of rule s that establish bases for evaluating members' actions:
This would include moral standards surrounding what work is to be considered good and bad, what work is "re al work" and, there fore, in contrast to "shit work", what formal and contextual rules are to be enforce d, what linguistic categorie s are to be use d in partitioning the world, and so forth. (Van Maane n & Barley, 1984, p. 303) V an Maane n and Barley (1984) argue that the salie nce of such rule s is heighte ned in situations where the occupation is marginalize d, pene trates multiple aspe cts of its practitione rs' live s, and involve s a rigorous proce ss of socialization. Each of the se conditions se rve s to incre ase the importance of the occupation as a referent for membe rs: social stigmatization and occupational pe netration of the social sphere turn group members inward for support, while peer socialization provide s a mechanism for e stablishing the moral supe riority of membe rs. This e mphasis on share d attribute s and values highlights the traditional conceptualization of community as consiste nt with cohe siveness and harmony (Gae tz, 1992) . Unifie d represe ntations of community have , however, be en challe nge d in recent anthropological research based on the structural diffe re ntiation of membe rs within communitie s and the simultane ous attachme nt of membe rs to more than one community (O 'Carroll, 1984) . Conflicting inte rests and multiple role s of members restrict the degree to which individuals will share attribute s and value s, de spite the ir membership in the same community.
A second se t of rules critical to an occupational community conce rns its boundarie s-its membe rship. While traditional conce ptualizations of community membership have revolve d around the ide ntification of common attribute s, such as inhabitance of a "deline ated geographical space " (Karp, Stone , & Yoe ls, 1977) , Van Maane n and Barle y (1984) argue for a phe nomenological basis: [W] e submit that the re levant boundaries of an occupational community are those se t by the membe rs themse lve s. He nce, the first attribute of an occupational community is that it is compose d of people who conside r the mselves "to be" members of the same occupation rather than people who "are" members of the same occupation . . . . Insiders may group themse lves along connotative dimensions that escape the uninitiate d an d those connotative dime nsions may lead som e members to separate themselves from others who do denotatively different work. (V an Maanen & Barley, 1984, p. 295) What V an Maane n and Barley (1984) are arguing most strongly for is a move away from membership definitions based on the judgme nt of "independe nt" observers, such as census bure aus or acade mics. Their support of a pure ly phe nome nological basis, "pe ople who conside r the mselve s 'to be ' members," must be te mpe red, howe ver, with a recognition of the role of membership boundarie s as social facts if our conceptualization of occupational community is to take the strate gic benefits of membership into account. Me mbe rship in an occupational community is ofte n associate d with control over some work domain, which may in turn lead to social or financial be ne fits. Conse que ntly, the re are ofte n significant membe rship boundarie s, such as appre ntice ships, establishe d which work both to restrict e ntry and socialize ne w membe rs through practice s of situate d le arning (Lave & Wenge r, 1991) . Profe ssions and trade s, in particular, often be ne fit from the reifie d membership boundarie s surrounding the ir occupations. Inde e d, occupational communitie s ofte n construct e xplicit rule s, whe the r codifie d formally or simply explicate d in day-to-day occupational discourse , that se rve to e xclude othe rs who might like to conside r the mselves community members and reap the associate d rewards.
Occupation al Self-Con trol
The importance of community rule s of practice and membership is evide nt in what Van Maane n and Barle y (1984) argue is the "special motive" for the de velopme nt of occupational communitie s: occupational se lfcontrol. In particular, the y highlight the te nsion betwee n occupational and organizational control ove r work: whe re work be comes rationalize d and accountable to organizational supervision, occupational control is weake ned (Van Maane n & Barley, 1984) . O ccupational control is also a matte r that transce nds organizations. Profe ssionalization, for example , is a transorganizational strate gy invoke d by occupational communitie s as a "move toward strong occupational control" (Abbott, 1991) . Rathe r than unde rstanding profe ssionalization as a functional result of the intrinsic attribute s associated with some occupation (e .g., Barber, 1965) , profe ssionalization he re is unde rstood as a patte rn of actions conce rne d with the manage ment of status and privile ge (MacDonald, 1995; Abbott, 1991) .
This conce ptualization of profe ssionalization highlights the ways in which actors ende avor to control "a marke t for work by e ngaging in con-tinual jurisdictional conflict with othe r occupational groups" (Anle u, 1992, p. 23) . Profe ssionalization is ofte n a conte ste d, political process in which various groups struggle for control over some work domain. The formalization of membership processe s and codification of knowle dge ofte n associate d with conte mporary profe ssions may work to unde rmine the re sources and re lationships associate d with traditional occupational communitie s. At the same time, the informal tie s and social base s of relationships in some occupational communitie s may se rve as re source s in the re sistance of professionalization.
A critical issue for unde rstanding occupational communitie s is the manne r in which the construction of an occupational identity, the de ve lopme nt of practice standards, and the e stablishme nt of membership rules work to support occupational se lf-control. If control ove r work domains is characte rized by continual conflict, then the structure and characte r of an occupational community may se rve to support or unde rmine a group's claim to sove reignty. In particular, the manne r in which the occupational community's form enge nde rs support from strategic constitue ncies outside the community may be critical. If the identitie s and rule s associate d with an occupational community involve the construction or allocation of re sources that produc e be ne fits for othe r groups, organizatio ns, or communitie s, those othe r actors may in turn work to support or prote ct the community. In the remainde r of this pape r, I draw on a case study to examine the relationship betwee n the structure of an occupational community, its construction of a critical resource, and its ability to maintain self-control.
CANADIAN FORENSIC ACCOUNTING COMMUNITY
Profe ssional accounting in Canada has e xpe rie nce d significant increases in the level of competition among firms. The tighte ning of the audit market caused by the wave of industrial merge rs in the 1980s and the increased cost-sensitivity among audit clie nts stemming from the re cessions in 1982 and 1990 have exace rbate d cost-base d compe tition among the accounting firms (Wootton, Tonge , & Wolk, 1990; Greenwood, Coope r, Hinings, & Brown, 1993) . Furthe rmore , the te chnology of audit has be e n deve loping to such an e xte nt that it has removed some of the profe ssional expe rtise require d, moving audit toward a commodity status (Be aver, 1986) . This degradation of the profe ssional accounting industry's most important source of e arnings and ide ntity has e xpande d the space for e ntrepreneurial accountants to extend the traditional conce ptions of profe ssional accounting to include se ve ral new se rvices.
Forensic accounting is one of the many new se rvices that has emerged in Canadian profe ssional accounting over the past 20 years. The ope rative definition of forensic accounting varie s among individuals, firms, and professions. At its most general, it include s all accounting done in support of or in coope ration with any legal proce edings. This is consiste nt with the dictionary definition of "forensic": "of or used in courts of law" (The Concise O xford Dictionary, 1990, p. 460) . This definition would include criminal case s such as the analysis of fraud for the Securitie s Commission or police force s, corporate engage ments such as the valuation of a company in a share holde rs' dispute , and civil litigation support such as the de te rmination of a loss of e arnings in a personal injury case. In de aling with the se engage ments, a primary role of fore nsic accountants is to provide e xpert analyse s, by serving as expe rt witne sse s in courtroom procee dings, supplying writte n re ports on the issue s in question, or both. In this se ction, I discuss the structure of a Canadian fore nsic accounting community, first de scribing the methods used in the study, and then outlining the re lationships be tween forensic accountants and the ir clie nts, the standards of practice develope d within the community, and finally the membership rules that de te rmine its boundarie s.
Method ology

Data Collection
In colle cting the data for this study, I utilize d a theoretical, or "purposive ," sampling design (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) . This form of sampling is marke d by its emergent prope rtie s: successive subje cts are chosen to e xtend information already obtaine d; the sample is continuously focuse d as insights and information accumulate ; and selection occurs until information re dundancy or saturation is achie ved. Sampling occurre d in stage s as information from previous interviewees was inte grate d and succe ssive interviewees were ide ntifie d. Each inte rvie wee was asked to identify their competitors, collaborators, clients, and influe ntial people and organizations in their field. The importance of the se networks is base d on evide nce from previous research (DiMaggio, 1991; Powell, 1991) that institutional change flows through personal and profe ssional linkage s.
The primary form of data colle ction was a se rie s of tape -recorde d, semistructure d intervie ws with accountants, lawye rs, and law enforcement office rs that focuse d on all of the inte rviewee s' activitie s that dealt with forensic accounting. Spe cific aspe cts of their practice s that were covered include : the re lationships among forensic accountants, their clients, and othe r profe ssionals; the rules, norms, and practice s associate d with forensic accounting; the attribute s, expe rience s, or actions that were require d to become involve d in fore nsic accounting, both for the ir own profe ssions and othe rs; and the resources that the y fe lt were critical. The interviews also cove red more general issue s including their strategies and the ir institutional and profe ssional conte xts. In total, 22 inte rvie ws, ave raging 75 minute s, were conducte d be tween January and June of 1992, 20 of which were taperecorded and transcribe d. The transcribe d inte rvie ws formed the primary database for analysis.
In the analysis of practice standards, a se cond data source was also utilize d: a se t of article s from Canadian legal te xts and journals that describe the processes and structure s associate d with the use of expe rt witne sse s in criminal and civil proc e e dings. The se artic le s were colle cted because of the comme nts of inte rvie wee s indicating the importance of judicial standards in the structuring of forensic accounting practice s and relationships.
Data Analysis
The primary analytical approach in this study re volve s around the developme nt of textual exhibits (Gephart, 1993 ) that represent the perspective s of the inte rvie wee s using se gme nts of the ir own te xt rathe r than paraphrase . Initially, all inte rvie w transcripts were importe d into NUD*IST, a qualitative data analysis software package that allows the re searche r to deve lop a hie rarchy of code s, link these codes to segme nts of the te xt unde r analysis, and pe rform a wide varie ty of te xt-and code-base d searches. The interview transcripts were coded in an iterative manne r, working back and forth be tween the ory and data. The te xtual e xhibits were the n analyze d with re spe ct to the spe cific the oretical conce pt unde r scrutiny. In the next section, re fe rences to the textual e xhibits are in the form of (Exhibit# .Segment# ), so that (2.6) would re fe r to Se gment 6 of Exhibit 2.
Relation ship s in th e For ensic Accoun tin g Com m u nity
Profe ssional accounting in Canada is organize d around geographical markets that are pote ntially served by small local firms, midsize national firms, and the "big six" international accounting firms. The inte rse ction of ge ographical markets and pange ographical firms has led to the deve lopment of profe ssional communitie s that are primarily but not exclusive ly ge og r ap h i c a l ly o r i e n t e d . T h e f o r e ns ic a c c o un t in g c om m u n it y un d e r conside ration here is base d in a weste rn Canadian province . Its membe rs ge ne rally work within the province , but the re are also ge ographically disperse d accountants whose spe cialize d or high-profile practice s include them in this community as well as othe r communitie s. In total, the re were approximate ly 10¯14 "establishe d" forensic accountants ope rating in the prov-ince at the time of the study, either residentially or trave ling to the province on an ad hoc basis.
Forensic accountants interact among the mselves and eve n more with the lawye rs and law enforce ment office rs who act as the ir primary clie nts. Fore nsic accountants communicate with each othe r at an institutional le ve l through their profe ssional associations, such as the Canadian Institute of Charte re d Accountants and the Canadian Region of the National Association of Certified Fraud Examine rs. These associations provide indire ct contact through the lite rature the y produce (e.g., CA Magazine) as well as direct contact at the various meetings and confe rences the y hold. The y also provide a chance for fore nsic accountants to work toge the r on institutional issues, such as the deve lopme nt of the CICA Inte rest Group on Forensic and Inve stigative Accounting. There is also a high le vel of aware ness of compe titors within the forensic accounting community; the group of e stablishe d forensic accountants is small and well known to e ach othe r. As one accountant note d, "It's a pretty small community so anybody that's re ally serious e nough or has be en serious are usually well known " (Inte rvie w, forensic accountant) . Fore nsic accountants within the same firm also interact extensive ly in inte rnal training sessions whe re newer, le ss e xpe rie nced forensic accountants are provide d training in such areas as presentation skills and case analysis.
The lawye rs that are involve d with forensic accounting also interact exte nsive ly with each othe r. First, the y provide re fe re nces to e ach othe r regarding fore nsic accountants they have hired in the past. The lawye rs interviewed were consiste nt in their support for refere nces from othe r lawye rs as the ir primary evaluation tool for hiring fore nsic accountants. The se lawye rs also interact in the seminars on forensic accounting e vide nce that the y attend. These seminars include complime ntary lunch-hour prese ntations provide d by forensic accountants as marke ting tools and more inte nsive seminars organize d by the lawye rs' profe ssional associations, such as the Civil Trial Lawye rs' Association.
Lawyers' and accountants ' inte raction with each occurs in four primary forms. First, forensic accountants are hired by lawye rs to provide analysis of accounting e vide nce and pote ntially provide expe rt te stimony, should the lawye r's case go to court. Private practice lawye rs generally hire forensic accountants on behalf of e ithe r criminal or civil clie nts, including corporations that are involve d in a civil action or are inve stigating some pote ntial internal fraud situation. The se cond mode of interaction involve s accountants marke ting the ir services to lawye rs, either informally through lunche s or dinne rs, or more formally through marketing pre se ntations. The third form of interaction occurs when accountants provide e ducational seminars for lawye rs, either complime ntary as anothe r form of marke ting, or paid seminars tailore d to spe cific audie nce s and issues. Finally, fore nsic accountants and lawye rs that deal with forensic accounting e vide nce share a high le ve l of aware ness of e ach othe r, although the re lative ly few fore nsic accountants compare d to the lawye rs that might pote ntially use their se rvice create s an asymme trical aware ness, with the lawye rs be ing more familiar with the roster of fore nsic accountants than the re verse.
Despite the connotative association be tween the te rm "fore nsic" and criminal legal proceedings, law e nforcement age ncie s are less extensive ly involve d in the fore nsic accounting community. Law enforce ment age ncies collaborate with each othe r on a varie ty of cases, as the combination of crime s that involve s fore nsic accounting evide nce ofte n crosses jurisdictional boundarie s. Like lawye rs, law e nforcement age ncies also hire forensic accountants for analysis and e xpert te stimony. Finally, law enforce ment age ncies work with private practice lawye rs (although ofte n in adve rsarial roles) in prose cutions in which forensic accounting evide nce is involve d.
Practice Stan dard s
There are two dominant sets of cultural standards that shape the practice of fore nsic accounting: forensic accounting standards and le gal standards.
Forensic Accoun tin g Stan dards
Standards regarding the practice of fore nsic accounting were primarily informal, focusing large ly on inductive reasoning and presentation style. Exhibit 1 pre se nts a se lection of comme nts by inte rvie wed forensic accountants discussin g the nature of practice standards in fore nsic accounting. Although not exhaustive , the interview segme nts in Table I summarize the comments of intervie wees through a broad, represe ntative se lection.
All inte rviewee s were questione d about the e xistence and importance of standards, and the pote ntial for the ir deve lopme nt. In Table I , they argue against the possibility of standards that act as "canne d programs" or "procedures" (1.1) . The interviewee s stre ssed the importance of "native intellige nce ," the construction of a case -specific "approach" (1.1) , and "mak [ing] it up as you go along" (1.2). The se characte ristics are re flected in the approach to training and learning associate d with fore nsic accounting, whe re case s are "totally a learning e xpe rience " (1.2) , and te chnique is base d on "expe rience more than anything" (1.3) . There are, howe ver, "some technique s that are widely known" (1.4) throughout the fore nsic accounting community, such as spotting "the re d flags" (1.4) . These informal practice standards involve a se t of he uristics that alert the practitione r to the pote ntial for fraud. Fore nsic Accountant 1 1. Whe n you do these files, like on fraud files for e xample, there is no such thing as a canned program. I mean you have to use your native intelligence on it. You've got to think, you know "what was the guy doing? " and how will I approach this. You can't tie it down to procedures. And I would say that probably applies to most of our files. (Interview, forensic accountant) 2. You've gotta sort of make it up as you go along on e ach file and it just is totally a learning e xercise. And in my view it always will be that way because no two losses are the same.
(Interview, forensic accountant) Fore nsic Accountant 2 3. Q: So in term of the things that you would do to dete ct fraud, where did the te chniques come from? Within the RCMP? We re they deve loped internally? A: Yeah, it was re ally through the experience more than anything of being involve d in fraud inve stigations. Whethe r it's how to interview people, the oddities you look for in the books and records. The technique s you might use to find out about the mindset of that person is ve ry important and it is usually the bits and pieces that you are able to put together to establish the fact that yes there has been a fraud perpetrate d he re . (Interview, forensic accountant) 4. I guess there is definitely some technique s that are widely known and then there would be some that we have develope d in-house. Like I say, the opportunities for fraud, the "red flags," those kinds of things are pretty much well known. (Intervie w, forensic accountant) Fore nsic Accountant 3 5. Whe n we ge t into the criminal stuff, it takes on a bit of a different flavor . . . we spend probably a lot mo re tim e in an aud iting type of proce dure , agre e ing on variou s e xpe nditures, che cks, far more auditing than what would be done by an auditor on a set of financial statements. If you don't look at the little stuff, the other side will make a big issue of it and cast doubt on your ability to have done work on the bigger transactions.
(Interview, forensic accountant) 6. We've thought about doing a manual and we've put toge ther a forensic manual nationally, but it's not ge are d to a specific task in there. It's more the review proce dures, things like that to insure if it's a business valuation that you have a Chartered Business V aluator look at it. If it's a specialized tax matter, you have a tax e xpe rt look at it. (Intervie w, forensic accountant) Fore nsic Accountant 4 7. Q: Are there any standards either in place or to be in place ?
A: Not in Canada-other than in the usual rules and professional e thics, but as far as standards of the work are concerned , not in Canada, but they are working on them in the United States . . . . But it is going to be a bunch of motherhood stuff, I mean, there is such a range of work. Q: What is the point then? A: I think it is more cover your ass for the profession-they want to be able to point out that they do have these standards in place in case some Senator gets up and que stions whether this is appropriate work for CPA's to be doing. (Intervie w, forensic accountant) Fore nsic Accountant 5 8. And once [forensic accounting is recognized as a speciality] then we can do something to improve the standards, to improve training, to improve the quality of the product that is out there as fore nsic accounting. And I have see n some horrendous reports by other accountants . . . . Ye ah, most typically it's on the plaintiff side whe re [the accountants] almost lose their objectivity and are trying to achie ve as high an award as they can without maintaining the ir cre dibility. It is ve ry e asy to rip the m apart, and it doesn 't do the profession much good. (Intervie w, forensic accountant) Fore nsic Accountant 6 9. Standards are much like anything else ; they are se t by common practice first and then that common practice e volves into a written documente d way of doing things or way of accounting things, whateve r. (Intervie w, forensic accountant)
The de ve lopm ent of more formal standards for fore nsic accounting practice s is a subje ct of a significant amount of discussion both within firms and at the le ve l of the profe ssional association. At the time of these intervie ws, howe ve r, fore nsic accountants sugge ste d that any such standards would like ly be ve ry general, "not geared to a spe cific task" (1.6) at the firm leve l, and "a bunch of mothe rhood stuff" inte nded to "cove r your ass" (1.7) at the profe ssion le ve l. Despite the pessimism regarding the deve lopment of practice standards, it was argue d that effe ctive standards might help "to improve training, to improve the quality of the product that is out the re as fore nsic accounting " (1.8) . Finally, there was a re cognition that any standards that were de velope d would like ly re fle ct the ongoing practices of fore nsic accountants (1.9) .
The comme nts from intervie wees sugge st that the re is no significant elaboration of formal standards of practice be yond those associate d with broade r profe ssional accreditation (e .g., Charte red Accountancy) . And to the e xtent that formalization proje cts are ongoing, interviewees are ske ptical about their results. There is, howeve r, a consiste nt e mphasis place d by interviewees on certain skills and personal attribute s associate d with forensic accountants -intellige nce and creativity (1.1) , inductive learning (1.2, 1.3) , ge tting into the mindse t of a perpe trator (1.3), spotting "red flags" (1.4), and thoroughne ss (1.5) . These skills and attribute s could form the basis for a set of practice standards to the e xte nt that they are conside red necessary e le ments of forensic accounting practice , and conse quently affect the be havior of members of the fore nsic accounting community.
Legal Stan dards
Fore nsic accounting is highly inte rde pende nt with the le gal syste m. Conse quently, legal and judicial standards play an important role in the definition of forensic accounting. Table II pre sents excerpts from interviews and article s from le gal texts and journals to summarize the legal processes that regulate the relationships among forensic accountants, lawye rs, and law e nforcement officials.
The thre e legal processes that regulate these re lationships involve the proce ss of "discove ry," the qualification of expert witne sses, and courtroom testimony. The discove ry process occurs prior to the beginning of a trial and increasingly involve s forensic accountants who aid in the compilation of information for evidence (2.1, 2.2). The role of forensic accountants as expert witnesses also involve s them in discove ry. Expe rt witne sses differ from other witne sses in that they are allowe d to offe r opinions as well as state facts. Conse que ntly, the discove ry process include s the admission of certain individuals as experts based on the ir "skill in the field in which the witness' opinion is sought" (2.4). The courts allow a wide varie ty of bases for admission as an expert, well beyond formal training or accreditation. Establishe d accre ditations do not exist for a broad range of the experts that the court system needs 3. E xpert testimony is intended to: "provide the judge and jury with a ready-made infere nce which the judge and jury, due to the te chnical nature of the facts, are unable to formulate" (Dickson, 1982 , in Sopinka, Lederman, & Bryant, 1992 . 4. So far as the law is concerned [the basis for an expe rt's qualification] is skill in the field in which the witness' opinion is sought. The admissibility of such evidence does not depend upon the means by which that skill was acquired. As long as the court is satisfied that the witness is sufficiently e xpe rienced in the subject-matter at issue, the court will not be concerned with whether his or he r skill was derived from specific studies or by practical training . . . (Sopinka e t al., 1992 , p. 536) 5. If you are not qualified, then good-bye, take your briefcase and all your docume nts, your slides, and e verything e lse and leave. I mean, that is why the Crown is going to be pretty careful in its se lection of their accountant . . . be cause they could spend te n, twenty, thirty thousand dollars on ge tting a report from some body. (Intervie w, criminal trial lawye r) Testimony Opinion/expe rt te stimony 6. The tre nd in Canadian litigation is the use of more and more expe rts. And to have the e xpe rts come in closer and closer to actually defining and giving their opinion on the very issue that is before the court . . . . At one point the courts would re fuse if an expert was giving an opinion on the very point that the court had to decide . . . be cause all that [the courts] want to be able to do is to be able to draw that conclusion themselves. (Intervie w, civil trial lawyer) 7. The re [used to be] a lot of reliance on just [entering expert opinion into e vidence] and just having the judge read it. Whe reas now I would ve ry rarely ever rely on it. If the other side is going to admit stuff then obviously you could use it, but if it came down to ne eding the testimony I would rathe r have the best possible. (Interview, civil trial lawyer) Cross-examination 8. The re's no que stion. Some of the lawye rs are playing American style courtroom cross e xamination type of thing . . . . They try and work it up. I would say more personal attack on your own credibility than there used to be. (Interview, forensic accountant) 9. I have yet to see a case where someone has give n evidence where I couldn't think of a doze n que stions that would te nd to alter that e vide nce . . . . Maybe the person who e mployed [the expe rt] said, "Look, assume all these facts and I will be proving them indepen de ntly." We ll shit, those facts may or may not be right. (Interview, fore nsic accountant) 10. I'd attack the accountan t pe rsonally on the way of cre dibility if the accountan t was somebody who I thought would not be candid on his or her answe rs . . . most things in this life are not black and white, . . . . If a witness wants to tell me that it is only black and won't move , then I may become more aggressive and less pleasant towards the witness.
(Interview, criminal trial lawye r) to accommodate . Falconbridge (1912 , in Sopinka, Lede rman, & Bryant, 1992 give s the e xample of an e xperie nce d hunte r who may be as well qualified to testify regarding the appearance of a recently fire d gun as a highlyeducated and skille d gunsmith. This fle xibility is important in newly developing domains, whe re formal accreditation proce sses have not be en develope d and re putation as an expert is base d large ly on experience and past court performance. Finally, testifying as an e xpert witness is the final stage of a forensic accountant's interaction with the courts. Expert te stimony is perceived as increasing in freque ncy and centrality to the judicial proce ss (2.6, 2.7) . With te stimony comes cross-examination, where the opposing counse l is allowed to que stion the witness. Despite the "expert" status of fore nsic accountants in the ir te stimony, the y are subje ct to an increasingly hostile environme nt with re spect to cross e xamination (2.8, 2.9, 2.10).
Mem bersh ip Rules
Two sets of membe rship rules for forensic accountants emerge d in the analysis. The first set include s formal, profe ssional associations and affiliations that serve to some what restrict participation in fore nsic accounting. The second, and more important, se t include s informal rules that take the form of either stereotype s that cast some people as "inside rs" and othe rs as "outside rs" base d on some particular characte ristics (e .g., se x, age , e ducation, expe rie nce), or social proce sse s (e .g., word-of-mouth) that work to include some and exclude othe rs.
Form al Mem bership Rules
Although the re doe s not exist any single , binary divide betwee n fore nsic accountants and othe r accountants based on some specific accre ditation, the constellation of affiliate d profe ssional bodie s doe s provide a basis for the formation of profe ssional identitie s and community boundarie s. Table  III pre sents a re pre sentative se lection of comme nts by intervie wee s regarding the role of profe ssional associations and accreditation in the membe rship of the forensic accounting community.
The formal qualifications associated with fore nsic accounting include a numbe r of compe ting de signations, dominate d by the Charte re d Accountant (CA) designation, which is the Canadian equivalent of the Certified Public Accountant designation in the United State s. The CA designation serve s as the "standard" accre ditation ope rating in what are pe rceived as "rathe r conservative courts" (3.1). It was ge nerally acknowle dge d by interviewees that to be conside red a "fore nsic accountant" in Canada, one almost certainly had to hold this de signation. Inte rviewee s also argue d, howe ve r, that although the (Gaston, Callaghan, & South, 1992) . At the end of its first year of ope ration, the Interest Group had a membership of 184 across Canada. In establishing Interest Groups, the CICA was drive n by previous "groups having to ste p outside the umbrella of the Provincial Institute s or the Canadian Institute and start their own thing" (3.3), including the EDP Auditors and the Charte re d Busine ss Valuators. The gene ral mandate of the Interest Groups was to provide a forum for networking, communication, and continuing e ducation (sIGnpost, 1992). However, it was acknowle dge d both inside and outside of the CICA that spe ciality accre ditation would like ly be on the age nda of some groups (3.5, 3.6) . For some forensic accountants, the deve lopme nt of the Inte re st Group was se en as "an atte mpt by the Institute to recoup ground that they lost be cause they neve r reacted to the market place and ne ver reacte d to [our] needs" (Interview, forensic accountant).
O ne reason for a negative reaction from some accountants was the "open door" policy that the CICA was initially instituting in the Intere st Groups. The lack of any membership barrie r for the Interest Group offered little promise of e xclusivity. The Groups' membership policie s were constructed in a manne r consiste nt with the traditional conception of the Charte red Accountant as a ge ne ral busine ss advisor, rathe r than a spe cialist, with no membe rship require ment othe r than simple intere st. Thus, for nonspe cialist CAs, the Interest Group would facilitate e ntry into forensic accounting; rathe r than raising barrie rs to e ntry, the Inte rest Group would, at least initially, lower them by providing formal continuing e ducation, e xplicit standards of practice , and an institutionalize d communication ne twork. Rathe r than prote cting the proprie tary e xpe rtise and ne tworks of contacts he ld by e xpe rie nce d fore nsic accountan ts, the Inte re st Group would work to commodify these resources by formalizing them and ope ning the m up to any interested Charte red Accountant.
Like the CICA Intere st Group, the Canadian Region of the National Association of Certified Fraud Examine rs (NAFCE) was e stablishe d early in 1992 with a Canadian membership of le ss than 100 in its first ye ar. The NAFCE, howe ver, is a multidisciplinar y body for which membe rship require s course work and examination. This Te xas-base d, for-profit organization include s: "pe ople from all walks of life , there are lawye rs, accountants, people in industry, banke rs" (Inte rview, fore nsic accountant) . As a mem-bership de vice, the NACFE is orie nte d both toward the establishme nt of a set of traine d fraud e xamine rs and the conne ction of those individuals with pote ntial clients. An e xample of the NAFCE's strate gie s for the latte r is the ir organization of The First Canadian Fraud Symposium in April of 1992. The Symposium, which I attende d, attracte d a broad cross-se ction of financial profe ssionals with an inte rest in fraud de te ction and prevention, including fore nsic accountants, corporate internal auditors, law-e nforcement office rs, and re gulatory age nts (NACFE Canadian Region, Symposium Registrants List, 1992) . These nonaccountant members of the NAFCE we re ge ne rally unde rstood by fore nsic accountan ts as pote ntial clie nts rathe r than competitors, large ly because lawye rs and law-enforcement office rs demande d a profe ssional accounting de signation as a minimum require ment for be ing hire d as a forensic accountant (3.1, 3.2) .
A third de signation-the Char te re d B usine ss Valuator ( CBV ) -is authorized by an inde pende nt association, again base d on a set of course work and examinations. Its alliance with forensic accounting is base d on certain type s of civil and corporate procee dings that require the assignme nt of value to an asset. The CBV is use d by fore nsic accountants as both a specific indication of valuation expertise and a more gene ral indication of profe ssional compete nce: "you pretty much have to pick up your CBV . . . it has become recognised ve ry fast" (3.10) . It is the most e stablishe d of the spe ciality accreditations associate d with fore nsic accounting, e stablishe d in 1971, with a membe rship of 395 at the time of the interviews. It doe s not, howeve r, targe t the forensic accounting community as directly as e ither the CICA Inte re st Group or the Canadian Region of the NACFE. Most of its membe rship is made up of CAs and othe r financia l profe ssionals who are not engage d in fore nsic accounting. As with the NAFCE, the CBV designation is not by itself sufficie nt to act as a legitimating de vice for those wishing to practice forensic accounting without a CA designation. Although valuation is an important aspect of some forensic accounting activity, the e mphasis that the othe r two associations place on fraud and inve stigative accounting place s them more square ly within the domain of forensic accounting.
The e xistence of the se competing profe ssional bodie s illustrate s the struggle within the Canadian forensic accounting community to establish some institutional frame work that will privile ge and prote ct its esote ric knowle dge , and provide a foundation of institutional le gitimacy for its work. Pe rhaps as a re action to this ambiguous institutional environme nt, some accountants hold se ve ral differe nt ancillary qualifications: The interaction of individualistic practice standards and weak, competing formal qualifications sugge sts a situation in which e ntry into the community might be re lative ly easy for aspiring forensic accountants . The practice standards and formal accreditation processes would se em to allow any individual with a CA de signation and an ancillary qualification or some specialize d e xpe rience to claim the status of a fore nsic accounting e xpe rt.
Inform al Membership Rules
It is the informal membe rship rules in Canadian forensic accounting that seriously limit the entry of new membe rs. Table IV prese nts a representative se lection of comments from inte rvie wee s regarding the role of informal membership rules in forensic accounting. In the inte rviews, wordof-mouth communicatio n emerged as a critical proce ss by which membe rship in the forensic accounting community was re stricte d. And along with the formal accreditations, expe rie nce and pe rsonality ope rate as membe rship require ments for fore nsic accountants.
In the fore nsic accounting community, word-of-mouth communication acts as a primary mechanism by which lawye rs obtain information about forensic accountants, generally from othe r lawye rs (4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5) . Intervie wee s argue d that the intensity of the practice and the small size of the marke tplace (4.6) interact with the risk of not be ing able to qualify a witness as expe rt (1.6) . Conseque ntly, lawye rs act conse rvative ly in the ir hiring of fore nsic accountants, de pending large ly on pe rsonal re fe rences from colle ague s. For the lawye rs, the value of the word-of-mouth information is asymmetric in that providing information re garding the pe rformance of a fore nsic accountant costs ve ry little in contrast to the high cost of hiring a poorly performing forensic accountant, not having obtaine d the word-of-mouth information. The combination of a de nse serie s of weak ties among the lawye rs and the re lative ly "che ap" information sugge sts a pe rvasive dissemination of the word-of-mouth information (Granove tter, 1973; Fre nze n and Nakamoto, 1993 ) . This coincide s with my expe rience in obtaining names for inte rviews. My list of pote ntial inte rvie wee s was ge nerate d in a "snowball" manne r base d large ly on re fe rences provide d by the interviewees themselves in response to direct reque sts and indire ct questions re garding compe titors, clients, and othe r relationships. In compiling this list, it be came cle ar that there existe d a small, well-de fined set of e stablishe d forensic accountants. This comment by a lawye r was typical:
My own attitude is that there are two accountants in town that I would call as e xpe rt e vide nce at this stage. I wouldn't call anyone other than those two . . . . But I perceive that there are probably five or six players in the forensic accounting field. (Interview, civil trial lawye r) Two powerful membe rship re quire ments, expe rie nce and pe rsonality, worke d in conjunctio n with word-of-m outh communication to limit the numbe r of legitimate forensic accountants. According to both fore nsic accountants and lawye rs, "succe ssful" courtroom expe rience is a critical factor (Interview, criminal trial lawyer) 9. Most lawyers now when they come to us for the work we do like to know that we have a CBV and that we have had court e xpe rience. Those seem to be the two que stions that are asked the most now. (Interview, forensic accountant) 10. There 's a bit of a catch 22: you have to have a way of establishing yourse lf first be fore you're going to get an opportunity to appear as an expert witness. And, I gue ss in that se nse there is some difficulty in ge tting, I guess, breaking into the area. (Interview, forensic accountant) Pe rsonality 11. Q: In that particular case how did you choose the accountant that you did?
A: Be cause of the flavor of the case and because of the confusion involved I needed somebody that I kne w would re ally pay a lot of attention to detail. I worked with a fellow in the past who is very enthusiastic and really gets into the detail and is ve ry careful. And I chose him on the basis of his e nthusiasm, but the real criteria was his attention to detail. (Interview, civil trial lawyer) 12. Q: Is there anything e lse that you are looking for?
M: A little bit of a She rlock Holmes-that they are intere sted in the academic challenge of trying to figure the puzzle out. Again not to be over dramatizing, but there is a ce rtain amount of curiosity that is re quire d, I think, to be a succe ssful forensic accountant.
(Interview, civil trial lawyer) 13. There are two type s of witnesses [to avoid]: the lion and the rabbit. And you start cross e xamining and the accountant becomes a lion, he is going to strike back and you don't want that. And you don't want the rabbit who you start questioning and pushing and he is gonna run like hell. (Interview, forensic accountant) in hiring decisions (4.7, 4.8, 4.9) . The othe r key informal require ment for forensic accountants is to be pe rceive d as posse ssing an appropriate personality. As indicate d in the discussion of practice standards, the successful practice of forensic accounting is wide ly unde rstood to be associate d with particular pe rsonality traits, such as "attention to detail" (4.11), "enthusiasm" (4.11) , "curiosity" or "a little bit of She rlock Holme s" (4.12) , and a balance d approach to testimony, being ne ithe r a "rabbit" nor a "lion" on the stand (4.13) . The conservative tende ncy of lawye rs in hiring e xpe rts is exace rbate d by this e mphasis on le ss obje ctive informal criteria such as personality and "succe ssful" courtroom performance .
The evaluation of e xpe rience and personality inte ract with the dynamics of word-of-mouth communication in two ways that e ffe ctive ly ke ep the pool of le gitimate forensic accountants to a minimum. First, individual lawye rs have relative ly small amounts of expe rience with individual forensic accountants and share that information free ly with their colle ague s. It has bee n argue d that in marke t situations:
. . . the structure of the word-of-mou th proce ss affe cts the te nde ncy of a population to display conformity or diversity [in purchase prefere nce] , with less communication [that is smaller, but nonzero samples for e ach individual] making conformity more likely. (Ellison & Fudenberg, 1995, p. 95) This is consiste nt with the conformity of opinion displaye d in the forensic accounting community, whe re lawye rs and law e nforce ment officials displaye d a marke d conform ity in the ir e valuation of individual fore nsic accountants.
Se cond, be cause negative word-of-m outh information often spreads more pe rvasive ly than positive information through a social ne twork (Technical Assistance Research Program, 1981) , information re garding a forensic accountant's poor courtroom pe rformance would like ly spread very quickly. This tende ncy also serves to restrict the entry of ne w practitione rs as the le ast expe rience d would naturally be the most like ly to e ncounte r resistance in the ir qualification as expe rt witnesses and display the le ast refinement in the ir te stimony. Be cause most formal qualifications are only recently emerging and are struggling for le gitimacy, informal membership rule s and proce sse s dominate the mainte nance of community boundarie s.
Reputation in Can adian Foren sic Accountin g
O ne of the important ways that the community standards and membership rules in the Canadian fore nsic accounting community be nefit community membe rs is through the deve lopme nt and mainte nance of strategic resource s. Although se veral important resource s surface d in the analysis, I focus here on one re source that was unive rsally conside re d to be critical: reputation as an e xpe rt. In my inte rvie ws, reputation was cite d by lawye rs as critical in the ir choice of a forensic accountant, and by accountants as critical in the e stablishme nt of a succe ssful fore nsic practice . Table V pre se nts a representative sample of interviewee's comments on the importance and role of re putation as a re source in the Canadian fore nsic accounting community. The first conte xt in which reputation is critical is in a clie nt's se lection of a forensic accountant. According to lawye rs inte rvie wed, "a re putation in the community" (5.1) was as important to the se lection criteria as specific sele ction crite ria such as formal qualifications. This was because lawye rs utilize d fore nsic accountants' reputations so as not "to have much difficulty in qualifying [the m] as an e xpe rt" (5.1). Reputation was argue d to diffe re ntiate be twee n the qualifie d and the "outstanding " fore nsic accountants (5.2) . As discusse d with respect to membership rules, reputation was circulate d through the word-of-mouth communication among lawye rs (5.3) . In general, re putation was an important enough resource in the hiring proce ss that it e stablishe d significant barrie rs to e ntry for aspiring fore nsic accountants (5.4) .
The second conte xt in which reputation acte d as a critical re source was in the courtroom, or more ge ne rally in the provision of expe rt opinion Table V . Intervie wee Comments on the Role of Reputation Selection 1. You want to use somebody that you don't think you are going to have much difficulty in qualifying as an e xpe rt. He has the training an d the crede ntials and some practical e xpe rience such that you don't anticipate a problem . . . . In ge neral, a reputation in the community. (Interview, criminal trial lawyer) 2. You do not make a de cision on an expert simply on the basis of who has the be st [qualifications] . In my mind, the thing that is outstanding about both of them is the gene ral re putation they have in the community. (Interview, civil trial lawye r) 3. Lawyers are quite frank in discussing e xpe rts with each other-whether one was a disaster on the stand or not and really that is the overall criteria for somebody who is going to become an expert. (Interview, civil trial lawyer) 4. One of the things in these niche markets is that it is ve ry much a business that "them that has ge ts." You have to build up a re putation and it is difficult to bre ak into these sorts of things. (Intervie w, forensic accountant) Testimony and cross-e xamination 5. I am not going to co-opt myself, say whateve r you want me to say, because in the end I have my own reputation that's on the line . . . . (Interview, forensic accountant) 6. The y have an opinion and it is pretty clear that they are not going to take a position that is extre me or unreasonable or that would be reje cted by the court, be cause they have a re putation to uphold. (Intervie w, civil trial lawyer) 7. If I have an e xpe rt that happe ns to be demonstrating the attitude of "What do you want? " then I become suspicious in te rms of using that type of an e xpert. [I re ly on] a gene ral re putation in the community. (Interview, civil trial lawyer) 8. A number of judgme nts that have gone in the last 2 years where the judge has been critical to the forensic accountant . . . . Yeah, most typically it's on the plaintiff side where they almost lose their objectivity and are trying to achie ve as high an award as they can without maintaining the ir cre dibility. It is ve ry e asy to rip the m apart, and it doesn 't do the profession much good. (Intervie w, forensic accountant)
by a forensic accountant whe the r in a courtroom or not. In this conte xt, the reputation of the fore nsic accountant benefited othe r partie s as well. Judge s and opposing lawye rs be ne fitted from the disciplining effects of the forensic accountant 's nee d to prote ct his re putation (5.5, 5.6) . The importance of reputation in se lection and hiring proce sse s e nsure d the e stablishe d fore nsic accountant 's inte re st in maintaining the ir reputation when offering opinions. Lawye rs hiring forensic accountants benefit from the accountant's reputation as it works to legitimate the ir claims (5.7, 5.8) . This was important e nough to the lawye rs that they would avoid accountants who se emed willing to compromise their own reputations by pande ring to a lawye r's wishes (5.7) .
Where forensic accountants have bee n perceived as losing their obje ctivity, they have be en subje ct to criticism by judge s, which affects not only the re putation of the individual but that of "the profe ssion" as a whole (5.8). Concern for compe titors' reputations was more prevale nt among the most establishe d group of fore nsic accountants, who were most like ly to offer positive comments about each othe r and least like ly to compare the ir abilitie s or be little the ir competition. They were more than willing, howe ve r, to offe r disparaging comments about those accountants who were either new or had exite d the field. For the forensic accountants who were the most well establishe d, re putation playe d a vital role in the mainte nance of the ir privile ge d position and the utilization of the ir e xpe rtise as a re source in the le gal community.
DISCUSSION
The nature of strate gic resource s has long bee n a central concern in organization theory (Benson, 1975; Galaskie wicz & Marsde n, 1978; Pfe ffe r & Salancik, 1978) . Traditionally, the focus of this re search has be en on the proprie tary control of resources in pursuit of powe r or competitive advantage (Pfe ffer & Salancik, 1978) . Pfe ffer and Salancik (1978) argue that for resource s to be utilize d in a strate gic manne r, they must be controlle d in a sove reign, nonre ciprocal manne r: in a re lationship be twee n two organizations, one of them will be powe rful if it "controls the allocation, access, or use of the re source" and the othe r "doe s not control the allocation, access, or use of othe r resources critical to the social actor's ope ration and survival" (Pfeffe r & Salancik, 1978, p. 44) . More re cently, the resourcebase d vie w of the firm (e .g., Hall, 1993; Pe te raf, 1993) has re -e mphasize d the importance of proprie tary control of key resources. Although the conceptualization of re source s diffe rs significantly betwe en the resource-depe nde nce pe rspe ctive and the re source -base d vie w of the firm, both approache s stress the criticality of proprie tary re sources.
In contrast, reputation in fore nsic accounting has two characte ristics that distinguish it from the traditional conce ptualization of strate gic resource s: the range of actors that can be ne fit from its production and mainte nanc e ; and, its share d "locus of control." With re spe ct to the first characte ristic, the benefits of reputation as a resource can remain private or be share d. Conside ring an e xchange re lationship, one possibility is that an actor's re putation might be nefit the actor at the expe nse of her/his trading partne rs. Predatory pricing is a paradigmatic e xample of this condition (Raub & Wee sie, 1990) , whe re a re putation for price cutting can e ffect barrie rs to e ntry around a market or industry. There is also, howeve r, the pote ntial for an actor's re putation to be nefit all those involve d in the e xchange re lationship, as in a self-enforcing agre e ment where an actor's re putation serves to provide information to the exchange partne rs that increases the joint-e fficie ncy of the re lationship (Raub & Wee sie, 1990, p. 632) .
Reputation as a re source in forensic accounting is bette r described by the latte r situation. Reputation acts as a critical resource that privile ges not only the accountant with whom it is associate d but all of the actors involve d in its formation and application. Lawyers and law enforcement officials rely on the forensic accountant's reputation as an e xpe rt to e nsure that their own activitie s remain meaningful and powe rful. Without expe rt forensic evide nce , the validity of these individuals ' claims against othe rs would be reduced; e xpe rt inve stigation and re asoning bring to the se claims, whethe r civil law suits, criminal prose cutions, or corporate dismissals, an obje ctivity that inflate s the ir le gitimacy and durability.
Inte rest in maintaining the re putation of a fore nsic accountant e ven exte nds, at least partially, to compe titors and to lawye rs not curre ntly engaging the focal fore nsic accountant. All fore nsic accountants have a ve sted interest in the legitimacy of the ir field as a whole . Although the fie ld is not ye t colle ctive ly profe ssionalize d, the courts do re cognize fore nsic accounting as a specific area of e xpe rtise. But lacking a formal accre ditation, the status of the fie ld is some what depende nt on the re putations of its individual practitione rs. This de pe nde ncy is particularly salie nt for the ne twork of more e stablishe d fore nsic accountants that ope rate within the community boundarie s. Their strate gic re liance on e xpe rience and personality communicate d through word-of-mouth he ighte ns their vulne rability to the degradation of reputations in the fie ld. This highlights the nature of competition in this fie ld, in which "For the specialists within the profe ssion the bigge st compe tition are the non-spe cialists within the profe ssion" (Inte rvie w, fore nsic accountant) . As in othe r knowle dge -base d networks (Powe ll, Koput, & Smith-Doe rr, 1996) , compe tition he re occurs both betwe en ne tworks and within ne tworks. Well-e stablishe d fore nsic accountants have a vested intere st in maintaining the re putations of the ir colle ague s as a critical re source and, effe ctive ly, a barrie r to entry.
Trial lawye rs engage d in an adve rsarial relationship with a forensic accountant have two sets of te nsions with re spe ct to the accountant 's re putation. O n the one hand, lawye rs are at time s increasing the ir challe nge s to the re putation and legitimacy of fore nsic accountants as e xpe rts (3.8) . O n the othe r hand, lawye rs argue d that the y, in fact, rare ly challe nge evidence base d on the credibility of the forensic accountant:
I would normally not attack the accountant's credibility. I would normally attack the accountants underlying factual foundation for his or he r opinion. (Interview, criminal trial lawyer) This re luctance to attack the accountant 's credibility might be due to the incre asing colle ctive expe rience and expe rtise of the forensic accountants who re gularly appe ar as expe rt witnesses. It might also be due , howe ve r, to the like lihood that any trial lawye r cross-e xamining a forensic accountant might be e ngaging that same accountant in the near future . With a ve ry limite d pool of expe rience d fore nsic accountants to draw from, challe nging an expe rt's re putation could be a poor long-te rm strategy.
The se cond distinctive aspe ct of reputation in the Canadian forensic accounting community is its "locus of control." Rathe r than being 'held' by any individual, re putation is colle ctively controlle d. The colle ctive control of re putation as a resource is highlighte d by the methods that researche rs use to measure reputation. Generally, some form of survey is take n of actors that would have contact or knowle dge of the focal actor. For e xample , in a study of reputational status of organizations in te chnical systems (Shrum & Wuthnow, 1988) , "judgme nts of othe r system participants . . . were aggre gate d to construct the primary measure of reputational status" (Shrum & Wuthnow, 1988, p. 891) . Such an approach is intuitive ly appe aling: "In a broad sense, the reputation of an actor is a characte ristic or an attribute ascribe d to him by his [trading] partne rs" (Raub & We esie, 1990, p. 629) . Although actors may be able to assess the importance of reputation (Hall, 1993) , they do not dire ctly control their own reputations in the community. The ir behaviors do influe nce that re putation (Lang & Lang, 1988; Shrum & Wuthnow, 1988) , but so do many othe r factors (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994) . In the fore nsic accounting community, the word-of-mouth communication among lawye rs is central to the reputation-building proce ss. Lawyers draw on second-hand descriptions as well as direct interactions with fore nsic accountants in their e valuations of expe rt reputations.
Thus, reputation is an accomplishme nt, not just of the forensic accountant with whom it is associate d, but also of the client and competitor communitie s. All of the actors engage d in this domain must be complicit in the production of any individual 's re putation for that production to be meaningful and valuable . The distribution of reputation is not so much a que stion of who "holds" it at any point in time , but who colle ctive ly contribute s to its socially manufacture d and sustaine d e xistence . From a ne twork pe rspe c tive , "Re putatio ns d e pe nd on th e 'e m be dde dne ss' of interactions in structure s or ne tworks of social re lations. They illustrate the effects of such e mbedde dne ss on the outcome s of interactions" (Raub & We esie , 1990, p. 626) .
Resou rces an d Occupation al Com m un ities
It se ems from the example of Canadian fore nsic accounting, that occupational communitie s may be associate d with re sources that are distinct from the proprie tary re source s on which organizational re se arch has traditionally focuse d. This finding is consiste nt with othe r recent re search. For example , Powe ll, Koput, and Smith-Doe rr (1996) found that in biote chnology networks, le arning and innovation are often locate d at the inte rorganizational le ve l, share d among a numbe r of partne rs. The y argue that "knowle dge creation occurs in the context of a community," rathe r than within the "canonical formal organization, with its bureaucratic rigiditie s" (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doe rr, 1996, p. 118) . In a ve ry diffe re nt conte xt, communal re source s also play a critical role in the subsiste nce farming ne tworks now found primarily in developing countrie s (Waring, 1988; Mies & Shiva, 1993) . Land, se ed, wate r, and labor are critical, share d re source s in the se ne tworks that be ne fit all members (Mies & Shiva, 1993) .
Both of these example s illustrate the important relationship be tween communal re sources and the characte ristics of the ne twork that the y re side within. In the biote chnology e xample , share d le arning and innovation are made possible by the commitme nt of biote chnology firms to the ongoing de velopme nt of re search partne rships and othe r linkage s (Powe ll e t al., 1996, p. 119) . In the case of subsiste nce farming, the influe nce of re sources on ne twork structure s has be en vividly demonstrate d by the e ffects of resource privatization (Waring, 1988; Mies & Shiva, 1993) . As pre viously communal lands have be en privatize d for comme rcial farming, the structure of many farming communitie s has be en shatte red, with the live s of men and women increasingly separate d by the division of paid and unpaid labor traditionally common to develope d countrie s (Waring, 1988) . These e xample s sugge st that communal re sources support and are supporte d by ne tworks with relationships and rule s that enge nde r coope ration over compe tition.
In Canadian fore nsic accounting, it is the inte rplay of practice standards and membership rules that effe ct a situation in which an individual 's reputation as an expe rt forensic accountant acts as a critical strate gic re-source . Practice standards associate d with the le gal conte xt privile ge individual e xpe rtise ove r colle ctive or corporate e xpe rtise. The re lationship between fore nsic accounting and the court syste m imme diate ly ne cessitate s an e xpertise veste d in individuals. O nly individuals can te stify in court: groups and organizations are unable to be fully re cognize d as such in courts (the notion of a corporation as a le gal "pe rson" e xe mplifie s this proble m). Be cause individuals are the re quisite vehicle of te stimony, the legitimation of those witnesse s must be on an individual basis. Practice standards concerne d with the practice aspe cts of fore nsic accounting also se rve to e scalate the importance of an individual 's re putation as an e xpe rt. Doing forensic accounting, as distinguishe d from the prese ntation of re sults, was describe d as a "black box" by practitione rs: its contents were large ly indescribable e xce pt in broad ge ne ralitie s, and its ke epe rs were in no way anxious to ope n up those practice s for more de taile d e xamination (se e Callon & Latour, 1981 for an extende d discussion of "black boxe s" in othe r social settings) . Obtaining knowle dge of these practice s is only possible through either an appre ntice ship with an establishe d e xpe rt or through the e xpe rience s gaine d in "doing small file s," either re al or simulate d.
Furthe rmore , membe rship rule s associate d with judicial process, including qualifying as an e xpe rt witness, te stimony and cross-examination, insulate the e xpe rt from his or her colle ctive conte xt. Although the expe rt may practice in a firm and be long to one or many associations, and although his or her legitimacy in a courtroom may de pend substantially on those affiliations, they are not usually e nough on their own: the re must be individually le gitimating characte ristics, such as expe rience and pe rsonality, which establish the pe rson's reputation as an "expert."
In general, resource s are typically controlle d either through the hierarchical structure s within organizations or through syste ms of exchange between organizations ope rating in marke ts. Thus, resources that are to be maintaine d across organizations and outside of a marke t system, require some method for controlling their use and distributing the ir benefits othe r than exchange . Whereas the "movement" of a proprie tary resource is limited only by the interconne ction of marke ts, for a re source to remain "communal," it must be held within a community's boundarie s. The de ve lopme nt of an occupational community provide s one solution to this proble m; as is typical of various mode s of social orde ring, those social patte rns and structure s that constitute the community make possible the resources necessary for its own re production (Law, 1994, p. 111) . Reputation, for example , is constructe d and controlle d in the patte rn of interaction among community members in forensic accounting, through talk, working toge the r, and othe r interactions. The be ne fits of a fore nsic accountant 's reputation are distribute d throughout the occupational community based on the practice and le gal standards in play. At the same time, be nefits and control are limite d to community members by the membe rship rules associate d with forensic accounting.
Communal resource s are powerful in the ir ability to provide compe titive advantage to members of an occupational community, as well as the community as a whole , in competition with actors and networks outside of the community. The mainte nance of forensic accountants' reputations, for example , privile ge s those accountants, lawye rs, and law-enforcement officers that ope rate from within the forensic accounting community. Conseque ntly, the construction and mainte nance of communal re sources provide s an important strategic motivation for the construction and mainte nance of occupational communitie s. This motivation, however, is pre dicate d on the abse nce of more powe rful or e fficient route s to compe titive advantage for community members. In forensic accounting, for e xample , the de ve lopme nt of formal accreditation syste ms might re sult in the commodificatio n of e xpertise, shifting the basis of e xpe rt status from a community-const ructed reputation to a individually-acquire d profe ssional de signation. The profe ssional designation might ope rate much more like a private re source , held by individuals whose clients' only re sponsibility would be to buy the associate d le gitimacy. If the be ne fits to a lawye r of an expe rt's reputation could be gaine d through the utilization of a formally accredited fore nsic accountant who was not associate d with a strong reputation, the n lawye rs might lose their motivation to maintain those reputations and the practice standards and rule s that support them.
CONCLUSIONS
The case of Canadian fore nsic accounting highlights the dynamic nature of occupational communitie s. These communitie s represe nt what Law (1994) has re fe rred to as "modes of ordering"; rathe r than e xisting as a single , cohe rent set of social structure s, the Canadian fore nsic accounting community represe nts a set of variously conte ste d and conflictual patte rns of interaction among not only forensic accountants but also the ir clients and the profe ssional bodie s that regulate (or attempt to re gulate ) the ir work. At the same time , howe ver, the Canadian fore nsic accounting community has, despite challe nge s from outside , manage d to maintain some effective standards of practice and rule s of membe rship that work to substantially privile ge its members. Thus, in examining occupational communitie s, re se archers must atte nd to patte rns of conflict and change as well as coope ration and stability.
A second important contribution of this study is the de velopme nt of the concept of communal resources. This conce pt exte nds curre nt re se arch on strategic re source s by including those that while critical and scarce are not the obje ct of competition. While curre nt re search on strategic re sources has conce ntrate d on the conditions ne cessary for firms to secure, control, and prote ct proprie tary re source s (e.g., Hall, 1993; Pe te raf, 1993) , this focus ignore s an important class of resources that are he ld in some colle ctive manne r. The se communal re source s are made possible by occupational communitie s, which allow for the de velopme nt of critical resources that are maintaine d colle ctive ly-outside of marke t and competitive mechanisms. Unde rstanding such re source s is particularly critical now, as rese arc he rs incre asingly shift the ir atte ntion from ste re otypic al, large corporations organize d as mode rn bure aucracie s toward networks of small and large firms whose organizing structure s fe ature colle ctive , communal, and familial patte rns (Redding, 1990; Powell et al., 1996) .
Exte nding this argume nt more broadly, sociologists have argue d that the adve nt of modernity has be en associate d with a ge ne ral commodification of our personal and profe ssional live s (Marx, 1976; Plant, 1992) , as resource s which once constitute d a colle ctively held "commons" are converted into proprie tary commoditie s (Mies & Shiva, 1993) . In light of this historical trend, the processes by which occupational communitie s are able to construct and maintain resource s such as reputation, le arning, and innovation as communal prope rty may hold much broade r implications.
